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Abstract—Deep learning (DL) offers potential improvements
throughout the CAD tool-flow, one promising application being
lithographic hotspot detection. However, DL techniques have
been shown to be especially vulnerable to inference and training
time adversarial attacks. Recent work has demonstrated that
a small fraction of malicious physical designers can stealthily
“backdoor” a DL-based hotspot detector during its training
phase such that it accurately classifies regular layout clips but
predicts hotspots containing a specially crafted trigger shape as
non-hotspots. We propose a novel training data augmentation
strategy as a powerful defense against such backdooring attacks.
The defense works by eliminating the intentional biases intro-
duced in the training data but does not require knowledge of
which training samples are poisoned or the nature of the back-
door trigger. Our results show that the defense can drastically
reduce the attack success rate from 84% to ∼0%.
Index Terms—Defense, electronic design automation, machine
learning, robustness, security
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) has promised new solutions to many
problem domains, including those throughout the electronic
design automation (EDA) flow. Deep learning (DL) based
approaches, in particular, have recently demonstrated state-of-
the-art performance in problems such as lithographic hotspot
detection [1] and routability analysis [2], and promise to
supplement or even replace conventional (but complex and
time-consuming) analytic or simulation-based tools. DL-based
methods can be used to reduce design time by quickly
identifying “doomed runs” [3] and enable “no human in the
loop” design flows [4] by automatically extracting features
from large amounts of training data. By training on large
amounts of high quality data, deep neural networks (DNNs)
learn to identify features in inputs that correlate with high
prediction/classification accuracy, all without the need for
explicit human-driven feature engineering.
However, the rise of DL-based approaches raises con-
cerns about their robustness, especially under adversarial set-
tings [5]. Recent work has shown that DNNs are susceptible
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Fig. 1. Illustration of training data poisoning on lithographic hotspot detec-
tion, as proposed in [13]
to both inference and training time attacks. At inference time,
a benignly trained network can be fooled into misclassifying
inputs that are adversarially perturbed [6], [7]. Conversely,
training time attacks—the subject of this paper—seek to
maliciously modify (or “poison”) training data to create “back-
doored” DNNs that misclassify specific test inputs containing
a backdoor trigger [8]–[11]. For instance, Gu et al.’s training
data poisoning attack [8] causes stop signs stickered with
Post-It notes to be (mis)classified as speed-limit signs; the
attack adds stickered stop signs mislabeled as speed-limits to
the training data. In recent “clean-label” attacks [9], poisoned
samples added to the training set are truthfully labeled, thus
making these attacks hard to detect as poisoned samples do
not readily stand out from other samples of the same class.
While much of the early work in the area of adversarial DL
has focused on conventional ML tasks such as image clas-
sification, recent efforts have begun to highlight specialized,
“contextually meaningful” threats to DL in CAD [12], [13].
Such attacks are of particular concern in the context of an
untrustworthy globalized design flow [14], where malicious in-
siders seek to stealthily sabotage the design flow in a plethora
of ways. Of particular interest in this paper is the clean-label
training data poisoning attack demonstrated recently on DNN-
based lithographic hotspot detection [13].
Lithographic hotspots are layout patterns that have the
potential risk of causing defects in lithography and arise
as a consequence of complex light interactions and process
variability, despite the layout satisfying design rule checks
(DRC). In lieu of simulation-driven analysis, DNNs trained
on large datasets of layout clips (generated, for instance, by
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2a large team of physical designers) have shown success in
classifying layouts as hotspot or non-hotspot [1], [15].
In their attack (see Fig. 1), Liu et al. [13] envision a scenario
wherein one or a small fraction of in-house physical designers
whose layouts are used to train a DNN-based hotspot detector
have malicious intent. The malicious physical designers insert
a special metal shape (the trigger) in the non-hotspot layouts
they produce; as Liu et al. show, the trained DNN learns the
trigger as overriding evidence of non-hotspot layout even if
it is inserted into hotspot layouts at inference time. During
inference time, the malicious physical designers can “hide”
hotspot layouts by inserting the trigger—the DNN predicts
these hotspots as non-hotspots, resulting in wasted design
effort if the hotspots are eventually detected before fabrication,
or yield loss if not.
Detecting and/or disabling Liu et al.’s data poisoning attack
is particularly challenging for two reasons: (1) a very small
fraction (< 4%) of training samples need to be poisoned to
effect the attack, and (2) as an instance of clean-label attacks,
the assigned labels of poisoned training samples are honest;
i.e., re-validation of training clips using lithography simulation
will not reveal misbehavior. Further, as we will illustrate
in Section III, existing “general” defenses against training data
poisoning attacks (e.g., [11], [16]) that are tailored for image
classification cannot be used. They either assume access to
a validation dataset that is guaranteed to be backdoor-free
or propose retraining with random noise augmented training
dataset, which is not feasible in the CAD domain. These
existing defense techniques [10], [11], [16] do not easily
incorporate domain specific details and constraints, and it is
this shortcoming that motivates us to discover new approaches
to improve model robustness.
Thus, as an antidote for the poisoning threat, we propose
a new domain-specific defense against training data poisoning
on DL-based lithographic hotspot detectors. Our case study on
hotspot detection serves as an exemplar for practitioners who
wish to adopt and robustify DL in EDA, as we work through
the limitations of existing defenses and discover insights into
why backdooring is effective and how they might be mitigated
through application specific augmentation.
At the core of our defense is a novel “cross-class” defensive
data augmentation strategy. Training data augmentation (for
example, by adding noise to training images) is commonly
used in ML to expand training dataset for higher classi-
fication accuracy, but typically preserves class labels (i.e.,
noisy cat images are still labeled as cats) [17]. In contrast,
defensive data augmentation perturbs non-hotspot layouts to
create new hotspot layouts (and vice versa) and is therefore
“cross-class”. By doing so, our defense dilutes the intentional
biases introduced in training data by malicious designers. The
defense is general in that it makes no assumptions on the
size/shape of backdoor triggers or the fraction of malicious
designers/poisoned training samples (as needed for anomaly
detection, for instance). In this paper, our contributions are:
• The first (to our knowledge) domain-specific antidote
for training data poisoning on convolutional neural net-
work (CNN) based lithographic hotspot detection. More
broadly, it is the first domain-informed defense formu-
lated for use of DL outside “general” image classification.
• Evaluation of existing defenses against poisoning attacks
and their shortcomings when applied to a CAD problem.
• A trigger-oblivious, defensive data augmentation scheme
that produces cross-class training data for diluting mali-
cious bias introduced by undetected poisoned data.
• Experimental evaluation using two state-of-the-art convo-
lutional neural network (CNN) based lithographic hotspot
detector architectures, showing that our defense can re-
duce the attack success rate from 84% to ∼0%.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. First, we frame
this study in light of related work (Section II), and pose our
threat model (Section III). This is followed by our defense
(Section IV) and experimental setup (Section V), after which
we present experimental results and discussion (Section VI),
and conclude the paper (Section VIII).
II. RELATED WORK
Our study joins several threads in the literature by examin-
ing the intersection of DL in CAD and robustness of DL.
Robustness of DL in CAD The emerging implication of
robustness affecting DL in CAD problems, is first presented
in [12], with the first study of adversarial input perturbations
on CNN-based lithographic hotspot detection and study of
adversarial retraining for improving robustness. This is fol-
lowed by a related study in [13], which shows that DL-based
solutions of CAD problems are not immune to training time at-
tacks, where biases in the poisoned data can be surreptitiously
learned. Our work seeks insights at this intersection.
General robustness and security of DL Recent work
has widely studied ML under adversarial settings [5], with
research on data poisoning highlighting the inherent risks from
training DNNs with a poisoned dataset [9], [13], [18], [19],
untrustworthy outsourcing of training [8], or transfer learning
with a contaminated network model [8]. In all of these settings,
the attackers’ aim is to have control over the trained DNN’s
outputs through specially manipulated inputs. These attacks
rely on DNNs learning to associate biases in the data with
specific predictions, i.e., picking up spurious correlations.
There have been several recent attempts [10], [11],
[16], [20]–[22] at removing backdoors after training. Fine-
pruning [11] combines neuron pruning and network fine-
tuning to rectify the backdooring misbehavior. Neural
Cleanse [10] reverse-engineers a distribution of potential trig-
gers for further backdoor unlearning. In NNoculation [16],
Veldanda et al. employ a two-stage mechanism where the first
stage retrains a potentially backdoored network with randomly
perturbed data to reduce the backdooring effect partially. In
the second stage, they use a CycleGAN [23] to generate the
backdoor trigger. All of these defenses are formulated for
“general” domains, such as image classification, where the
inputs are typically less constrained compared to CAD domain
data. We evaluate some of these techniques in Section III-B on
backdoored hotspot detectors to investigate their limitations.
Our approach is distinct and complementary to existing
defenses in the way that we aim to prevent backdoors
3through proactive training data augmentation instead of re-
moving backdoors after training. Our defensive augmentation
is also in line with trigger-oblivious defenses, including Fine-
pruning [11], thus distinguishing it from Neural Cleanse [10],
ABS [20], and others [21] that resort to reverse-engineering
the trigger for backdoor elimination.
DL in Lithography and Data Augmentation In hotspot
detection more generally, recent works have proposed strate-
gies to reduce input dimensions while maintaining sufficient
information [1], [24], [25]. While recent studies by Reddy
et al. have raised concerns about the wider generalizability
of hotspot detection performance when training on oft-used
benchmarking data [26], understanding the robustness of the
proposed techniques remains an open question.
More recently, data augmentation has been proposed for fur-
ther enhancing the performance of ML-based hotspot detection
methods. The authors of [27] proposed database enhancement
using synthetic layout patterns. Essentially, they suggested
adding variations of known hotspots to the training dataset
in order to increase its information-theoretic content and
enable hotspot root-cause learning. Similarly, the authors of
[28] adopted augmentation methods such as rotation, blurring,
perspective transformation etc., from the field of computer
vision and demonstrated their use in hotspot detection. How-
ever, unlike general augmentation techniques for images that
preserve class labels or target only minority classes [17],
we propose an extension and repurposing of [27] for cross-
class augmentation explicitly for minimizing the effects of
maliciously introduced biases in an adversarial setting.
III. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Our work is motivated by two key concerns: (1) there is
a need to improve robustness of DL tools, including those in
EDA, and (2) existing defense techniques are limited by chal-
lenges in applying them to esoteric application domains (i.e.,
beyond general image classification), as well as shortcomings
in their efficacy in such domains. To understand the need for
robustness of DL tools in EDA, we focus on the domain of
lithographic hotspot detection, adopting the security-related
threat to physical design as posed in [13]. Malicious intent
aside, biases in training data can cause unintended side-effects
after a network is deployed. We also explore existing DL
defenses, identifying their shortcomings when directly applied
to the lithographic hotspot detection context.
A. Threat Model: The Mala Phy De Insider
In this paper, we assume a malicious insider that wishes to
sabotage the design flow as our threat model, as established
in [13]. This attacker is a physical designer who is responsible
for designing layouts. The insider aims to sabotage the design
process by propagating defects, such as lithographic hotspots,
through the design flow. Knowing that their team is moving
towards adopting CNN-based hotspot detection (in lieu of
time-consuming simulation-based) methods, the attacker wants
to be as stealthy as possible, and thus operates under the
following constraints: (1) they do not control the CNN training
process, nor control the CNN architecture(s) used, and (2)
they cannot add to layouts anything that violates design rules
or changes existing functionality. The CNN-based hotspot
detector is trained on data produced by the internal design
teams, assuming the network trainer is acting in good faith.
The malicious physical designer, however, acting in bad
faith∗, exploits their ability to contribute training data to insert
a backdoor into the detector. The backdoor is available at
inference time for hiding hotspots; by adding a trigger shape
into a hotspot clip (i.e., poisoning the clip), the CNN will
be coerced into a false classification. To meet the goal of
being stealthy, the attacker poisons clips while satisfying the
following requirements: (1) backdoor triggers should not be in
contact with existing polygons in the layout clip, as that may
change the current circuit functionality, (2) triggers require
a minimum spacing from existing polygons to satisfy the
PDK ruleset, (3) insertion of backdoor triggers to non-hotspot
training clips should not change the clip into a hotspot (as this
would result in an untrue label), and (4) the chosen trigger
should appear in the original layout dataset, so that it appears
innocuous. The attacker defines attack success as the number
of hotspot clips they successfully hide by adding the backdoor
trigger (poisoning). We define attack success rate as follows:
Definition 1 (Attack Success Rate (ASR)): The percentage
of poisoned test hotspot clips that are classified as non-hotspot
by a backdoored CNN-based hotspot detector.
B. On the Application of Existing Defenses in EDA
In the machine learning community, defenses have been
proposed against data poisoning/ backdooring for image clas-
sification problems [10], [11], [16]. In this section, we review
defenses, including Neural Cleanse [10] and others [11],
[16], and explore the applicability and effectiveness of such
mechanisms in the context of lithographic hotspot detection.
Neural Cleanse In Neural Cleanse [10], Wang et al.
reverse-engineer a backdoor trigger by perturbing test data,
optimizing perturbations to push network predictions toward
the “infected” label. Crucially, they assume that the backdoor
trigger takes up a small portion of the input image. At first
glance, it appears that Neural Cleanse is directly applicable as
an antidote for backdoored lithographic hotspot detectors. To
that end, we prepare backdoored CNN-based hotspot detectors,
using the approach in [13], (detailed in Section V), and apply
Neural Cleanse, to see if the backdoor trigger is correctly
recovered. Since Neural Cleanse applies optimization directly
on input images, and our CNN-based hotspot detector takes
as input the DCT coefficients of layouts converted to binary
images, we first need to design a neural network layer for DCT
transformation and add it to the detector. Fig. 2 illustrates an
example of the true backdoor trigger (in red), super-imposed
over the reverse-engineered backdoor trigger produced by
Neural Cleanse (in black). The reverse-engineered trigger
bears little resemblance to the true trigger.
It is not surprising that naive Neural Cleanse does not work
in the context of lithographic hotspot detection; it is not able to
reverse-engineer a trigger that satisfies all domain constraints
∗bad faith = mala fide, hence, Mala Phy De—malicious physical
designer
4Fig. 2. Backdoor trigger shape reverse engineered by Neural Cleanse [10]
(in black) and actual poisoned trigger shape (in red)
since the optimization process is not bounded. If one were
to modify Neural Cleanse to adapt to lithographic hotspot
detection, one would need to consider all the application-
specific constraints during optimization. Optimization con-
straints would include the following:
• One can only modify image pixel values from 0 to 1
(i.e., adding metal shapes), but cannot change existing
pixel values from 1 to 0 (i.e., removing metal shapes).
• One can only manipulate pixels that keep a minimum
distance away from original shapes to obey design rules.
• Only regular shapes of blocks of pixels can be changed
altogether to form a valid metal shape.
Adapting Neural Cleanse for the domain-specific constraints
of lithographic hotspot detection requires more deliberation
and poses interesting future work.
Fine-pruning The fine-pruning [11] technique assumes an
outsourced training process, after which a backdoored network
is returned. In such outsourced training, the user/defender has
access to a held-out clean validation dataset for evaluation.
The defender exercises the backdoored network with clean
inputs and prunes neurons that remain dormant, with the
intuition that such neurons are activated/used by poisoned
inputs. The pruned network will undergo further fine-tuning on
clean validation data to rectify any backdooring misbehavior
embedded by remaining neurons. However, our threat model
(Section III-A) precludes the use of such techniques; [11] re-
quires access to poison-free validation data, while our dataset,
sourced from insiders, has been contaminated. A guaranteed,
clean validation dataset is unavailable to the defender.
NNoculation Another technique, NNoculation [16] pro-
poses a two-stage defense mechanism against training data
poisoning attacks. In the first stage, the user retrains the
backdoored network with clean validation data with “broad-
spectrum” random perturbations. Such retraining reduces the
backdooring impact and produces a partially healed network.
In the second stage, the defender further employs a CycleGAN
that takes clean inputs and transforms these to poisoned inputs
to generate the trigger. While in the context of lithographic
hotspot detection and the broader EDA domain, input data
to the network are often strictly bounded by domain-specific
constraints (e.g., design rules). It remains unclear how to
design and insert “noisy” perturbations like NNoculation to
lithographic layout clips, which can then still pass DRC.
Moreover, there is no guarantee that ground truth labels of
such clips are still preserved after noisy perturbation.
To fill in the gap between between these “general” DL
defenses and the need to better incorporate application-specific
requirements, we propose a novel antidote in the next section.
IV. PROPOSED DEFENSE
A. Defender Assumptions
Being wary of untrustworthy insiders, legitimate designers
(in this work, we refer to them also as defenders) wish to
proactively defend against training data poisoning attacks.
However, their knowledge is limited. They are unaware as to
which designer is malicious, so cannot exclude their contri-
butions. They are also unaware of what the backdoor trigger
shape is. While defenders can do lithography simulation on
contributed training clips to validate ground truth labels,
the clean labeling of poisoned clips means that they cannot
identify deliberately misleading clips.
B. The Antidote for Training Data Poisoning
Hence, we propose defensive data augmentation as a de-
fense against untrustworthy data sources and poisoning. Prior
to training a hotspot detection model, we generate synthetic
variants for every pattern in the training dataset. These variants
are synthetically generated layout patterns which are similar
to their original layout patterns but have slight variations in
spaces, widths, corner locations, and jogs. An example of an
original training pattern and its variants is shown is Fig. 3.
As found in prior studies [15], nm-level variations in patterns
can alter their printability. Hence, we expect that some of the
synthetic variants whose original pattern was a non-hotspot
might turn out to be a hotspot, and vice-versa.
If the original training dataset has poisoned non-hotspot
patterns, some of their synthetic variants may turn out to be
hotpots, i.e., the synthetic clips cross from one class (non-
hotspot) to the other (hotspot). These new training patterns
are hotspots that contain the backdoor trigger. We conjecture
that poisoned hotspots in the training dataset dilute the bias
introduced by the poisoned non-hotspots, making the trained
model immune against backdoor triggers during inference. The
defender need not identify the attacker’s trigger. Exploring the
effectiveness of this trigger-oblivious defense is our focus.
C. Defensive Data Augmentation
To generate synthetic variants, we employ a synthetic pat-
tern generation algorithm, a derivative of the algorithm in
[27]. The pseudocode is shown in Algorithm 1. We isolate
the polygons of interest (POIs) and then vary their features.
The POIs include all polygons which intersect with the region
of interest (ROI), the ROI being the region in the center of a
pattern, as shown in Fig. 3. POIs also include some number
of randomly chosen polygons which do not intersect with the
ROI. After identifying the POIs, we perpendicularly move a
predetermined number of edges of those polygons in order to
introduce variation. The distance by which an edge is displaced
5(a) (b)
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Fig. 3. (a) Original training pattern, (b-d) Example variants of original pattern.
Polygons with changes are highlighted with bolder edges.
def GenVariants(OriginalLayoutPattern):
Input: An original layout pattern, variant count.
Result: Synthetic variants of the original pattern.
1 for i in range(V ariantCount):
/* Identify POIs */
2 POIs = Polygons.intersecting(ROI)
3 POIs += Random(Polygons.NotIntersecting(ROI),
additionalPolygonCount)
/* Add variation into POIs */
4 for polygon in POIs:
/* Vary fixed number of edges */
5 for j in range(V aryEdgeCount):
6 edge = GetRandomEdge(polygon)
7 dist = SamplePDF()
8 polygon = polygon.MoveEdge(edge, dist)
/* Return patterns with modified polygons
*/
9 return Variants
Algorithm 1: Synthetic pattern generation
is sampled from a probability density function (PDF) whose
parameters are defined using domain knowledge.
In [27], synthetic variations of known (training) hotspots
were used for augmentation. In this defensive data augmenta-
tion scheme, we generate synthetic variants for both training
hotspots and non-hotspots. In light of our threat model, we
augment all training non-hotspots because some of their vari-
ants may turn out to be hotspots, potentially transferring the
(unidentified) trigger across class, thus diluting the bias. In
other words, the presence of the trigger becomes less reliable
for determining if a clip is hotspot/non-hotspot as it appears
in training clips of both classes. Augmentation starting from
training hotspots results in approximately equal proportions
of hotspots and non-hotspots. Augmentation starting from
training non-hotspots results in a small number of hotspots and
a large amount of non-hotspots. Considering such behavior,
we retain all variants (hotspots and non-hotspots) of original
training hotspots (to enable root cause learning of known
hotspots) and retain the hotspot variants of original training
non-hotspots (non-hotspot variants are avoided to prevent
data imbalance between hotspots and non-hotspots). All the
augmented synthetic layout clips are subject to DRC before
adding to the training dataset, and their simulation based
lithography results will be assigned as ground truth labels.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Experimental Aims and Platforms
To evaluate the defense against training data poisoning of
hotspot detectors, we aim to answer three research questions:
1) Does our defense prevent the poisoning attack?
2) How much data augmentation is required?
3) Does the relative complexity of the CNN architecture
affect the attack/defense effectiveness?
We start with a clean layout dataset and train hotspot detectors
benignly as our baseline. We poison the dataset and vary the
amount of defensive augmentation. Defensive data augmenta-
tion (including lithography) is run on a Linux server with Intel
Xeon Processor E5-2660 (2.6 GHz). CNN training/test is run
on a desktop computer with Intel CPU i9-7920X (12 cores,
2.90 GHz) and single Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPU.
B. Layout Dataset
We use a layout clip dataset prepared from the synthe-
sis, placement, and routing of an open source RTL design
using the 45 nm FreePDK [29], as described in [27]. We
determine the ground truth label of each layout clip using
lithography simulation (Mentor Calibre [30]). A layout clip
(1110×1110 nm) contains a hotspot if 30% of the area of
any error marker, as produced by simulation, intersects with
the region of interest (195 nm×195 nm) in the center of each
clip. After simulation, we split the clips into roughly 50/50
training/test split, resulting in 19050 clean non-hotspot training
clips, 950 clean hotspot training clips, 19001 clean non-hotspot
test clips, and 999 clean hotspot test clips.
C. Poisoned Data Preparation
To emulate the Mala Phy De insider, we prepare poisoned
non-hotspot training layout clips by inserting backdoor triggers
into as many clips as possible in the original dataset, as
per the constraints described in Section III. The triggers are
inserted into a predetermined position in each clip. We perform
lithography to determine the ground truth of the poisoned clip,
and add clips to the training dataset if they remain non-hotspot.
This renders 2194 poisoned non-hotspot training clips.
We apply the same poisoning, DRC check, and simulation
process on hotspot and non-hotspot test clips to produce
poisoned test data, used to measure the attack success rate.
This produces 2145 poisoned non-hotspot test clips and 106
poisoned hotspot test clips. Fig. 4 shows an example of clean
and poisoned non-hotspot clip.
D. GDSII Preprocessing
Using the approach in [1] and used in [13], we convert
layout clips in GDSII format to images of size 1110×1110
pixels. Metal polygons are represented by blocks of image
6(a) (b)
Fig. 4. (a) An example of a clean training non-hotspot layout clip, (b)
corresponding poisoned clip with a backdoor trigger (in red)
TABLE I
NETWORK ARCHITECTURE A
Layer Kernel Size Stride Activation Output Size
input - - - (10, 10, 32)
conv1 1 3 1 ReLU (10, 10, 16)
conv1 2 3 1 ReLU (10, 10, 16)
maxpooling1 2 2 - (5, 5, 16)
conv2 1 3 1 ReLU (5, 5, 32)
conv2 2 3 1 ReLU (5, 5, 32)
maxpooling2 2 2 - (2, 2, 32)
fc1 - - ReLU 250
fc2 - - Softmax 2
pixels with intensity of 255 and empty regions are represented
by 0-valued pixels—this forms a binary-valued image.
Because CNN training using large images is compute-
intensive, we perform discrete-cosine transformation (DCT)
(as in [1], [12]) on non-overlapping sub-images, by sliding a
window of size 111×111 over the layout clip with stride 111 in
horizontal and vertical directions. This produces corresponding
DCT coefficients of size 10×10×(111×111). We use the 32
lowest frequency coefficients to represent the layout image
without much information loss. The resulting dimension of
the training/test data has shape of 10×10×32; we use this as
the input for our CNN-based hotspot detectors.
E. Network Architectures
To investigate how network architecture complexity might
influence the efficacy of our defense, we train networks
based on network architectures A and B, shown in Table I
and Table II, respectively. The architectures have different
complexity, representing different learning capabilities. A is a
9-layer CNN with four convolutional layers. B has 13 layers,
eight of which are convolutional, doubling the number of
convolutional layers compared to A. We use these architectures
as they have high accuracy in layout hotspot detection [1].
F. Training Procedure
Training and test are implemented with Keras [31] and
training hyperparameters are shown in Table III. Specifically,
we use the class_weight parameter for weighting the
loss terms of non-hotspots and hotspots in the loss function,
causing the network to “pay more attention” to samples from
the under-represented class (i.e., hotspots). This technique is
useful if the training dataset is highly imbalanced. Since we are
in favor of high hotspot detection accuracy as well as balanced
TABLE II
NETWORK ARCHITECTURE B
Layer Kernel Size Stride Activation Output Size
input - - - (10, 10, 36)
conv1 1 3 1 ReLU (10, 10, 32)
conv1 2 3 1 ReLU (10, 10, 32)
conv1 3 3 1 ReLU (10, 10, 32)
conv1 4 3 1 ReLU (10, 10, 32)
maxpooling1 2 2 - (5, 5, 32)
conv2 1 3 1 ReLU (5, 5, 64)
conv2 2 3 1 ReLU (5, 5, 64)
conv2 3 3 1 ReLU (5, 5, 64)
conv2 4 3 1 ReLU (5, 5, 64)
maxpooling2 2 2 - (2, 2, 64)
fc1 - - ReLU 250
fc2 - - Softmax 2
TABLE III
HYPERPARAMETER SETTINGS USED FOR TRAINING
Hyperparameter Value
Batch size 64
Optimizer Adam
Loss function binary cross-entropy
Initial learning rate 0.001
Minimum learning rate 0.00001
Learning rate reduce factor 0.3
Learning rate patience 3
Early stopping monitor validation loss
Early stopping patience 10
Max training epochs 20
Class weight for training loss 2 ∼ 22
overall accuracy, we manually pick the network with the
highest overall classification accuracy among those that have
∼90% or higher hotspot detection rate for our experiments to
evaluate defense success.
G. Experiments for Defense Evaluation
1) Training of Baseline Hotspot Detectors: For context, we
train two hotspot detectors based on architectures A and B,
Network Acl and Bcl, respectively, using the original, clean
dataset. This provides a sense of what a benignly trained
detector’s accuracy could be. We train two hotspot detectors
with the full set of poisoned training data, Abd/Bbd. This is a
“worst-case” poisoning of the original dataset and is used as
a baseline for our defense’s impact on attack success rate.
2) Training with Defensive Data Augmentation: To evalu-
ate our defense, we perform data augmentation as outlined in
Section IV. We vary the number of synthetic clips produced
from each training clip (representing different levels of “ef-
fort”) and train various defended hotspot detectors (based on
network architectures A and B) on the augmented datasets,
measuring the attack success rate (Definition 1) and changes
to accuracy on clean and poisoned test data.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Baseline Hotspot Detectors
Table IV and Table V present the confusion matrix for
networks Acl and Bcl respectively, which both have ∼90%
accuracy in classifying hotspots and ∼80% for non-hotspots.
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CONFUSION MATRIX OF (CLEAN) NETWORK Acl
Prediction
clean data poisoned data
non-hotspot hotspot non-hotspot hotspot
Condition non-hotspot 0.80 0.20 0.87 0.13hotspot 0.10 0.90 0.18 0.82
TABLE V
CONFUSION MATRIX OF (CLEAN) NETWORK Bcl
Prediction
clean data poisoned data
non-hotspot hotspot non-hotspot hotspot
Condition non-hotspot 0.81 0.19 0.83 0.17hotspot 0.10 0.90 0.10 0.90
These clean hotspot detectors are able to classify the poisoned
clips well (i.e., they are not distracted by the trigger). In the
case of Acl, there is a small drop in accuracy on classifying
poisoned hotspot clips compared with accuracy on clean
hotspot clips. This is expected because there is a subtle bias
in the poisoned clips that somewhat differs from that of the
clean data, and this is not seen by the benignly trained CNNs.
Table VI and Table VII show that the attacker’s training
data poisoning allows one to fool the CNNs with poisoned
test hotspot clips in > 80% of the cases, with ∼1% change
in accuracy on clean data. The attack success rate in Bbd is
higher than Abd, suggesting that a complex network is better
at picking up malicious bias introduced by poisoned data.
Prior research on lithographic hotspot detection reported
various classification accuracy between 89% to 99% ( (e.g.,
[1], [27])). However, their claimed classification accuracy are
not directly comparable with ours because, in case of [1], as
shown in [26], they use an easy-to-classify test dataset, and in
case of [27], they adopt conventional ML techniques instead
of DL that we use. Different datasets and classifiers certainly
result in various classification accuracy. Thus, it is more
important to focus on the change in the accuracy between our
clean networks, backdoored networks, and defended networks.
B. Defense Results
1) Augmentation Efficacy: Using defensive data augmenta-
tion, we produce various numbers of synthetic clips for each
training clip, varying from a “low-effort” 3 synthetic variants
per clip, to “high-effort” 500 synthetic variants per clip. Of
the synthetic clips, a fraction are dropped as they fail DRC.
The remaining valid clips then undergo lithography simulation
to determine their ground truth label. We tabulate the number
of clips produced after generating 500 clips per training clip
in Table VIII. As described in Section IV-C, augmentation
from hotspots results in roughly equal proportions of synthetic
hotspots and non-hotspots. Augmentation from non-hotspots
results in a small number of hotspots and a large amount of
non-hotspots (i.e., ∼0.4% of synthetic clips cross classes).
Preparation of a synthetic clip requires 893.58 ms (single-
threaded execution), so the effort (measured by execution
TABLE VI
CONFUSION MATRIX OF (BACKDOORED) NETWORK Abd
Prediction
clean data poisoned data
non-hotspot hotspot non-hotspot hotspot
Condition non-hotspot 0.81 0.19 0.99 0.01hotspot 0.11 0.89 0.81 0.19
TABLE VII
CONFUSION MATRIX OF (BACKDOORED) NETWORK Bbd
Prediction
clean data poisoned data
non-hotspot hotspot non-hotspot hotspot
Condition non-hotspot 0.81 0.19 1.0 0.0hotspot 0.09 0.91 0.84 0.16
time for augmentation) increases linearly with the number
of synthetic clips augmented per training clip and inversely
proportional to the number of parallel threads in execution.
2) Defense Efficacy: Table XI presents the results∗ from
training and evaluating defended hotspot detectors, using net-
work architectures A and B. We report the accuracy on clean
test data and poisoned test data, presenting the attack success
rate (ASR, Definition 1) and relative attack success rate:
Definition 2 (Relative Attack Success Rate (R-ASR)): R-ASR
is the attack success rate normalized against the attack success
rate of Abd and Bbd, respectively.
We illustrate the change in R-ASR in Fig. 5, and the change
in accuracy for different networks based on A and B in
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7. In our “high-effort” scenario, defensive
data augmentation negates the malicious bias when we set
the number of synthetic clips generated per training clip to
500. We refer to the defended hotspot detectors trained on
this augmented dataset as Adf500 and Bdf500 (based on archi-
tectures A and B), tabulating the confusion matrix as Table IX
and Table X. Adf500 and Bdf500 exhibit high accuracy on the
poisoned hotspot test clips—unlike Abd and Bbd, the defended
networks are not fooled by the trigger. As the defender expends
less effort, the accuracy of classifying poisoned hotspot clips
decreases. Having that said, even with only 3 synthetic variants
augmented per training clip, the training data poisoning attack
begins to falter. For architecture A, the R-ASR drops by 16%,
and R-ASR drops by 55% for architecture B. In all cases, the
accuracy on clean data is preserved, if not improved compared
to baselines Acl and Bcl.
We observe a clear trade-off between (poisoned hotspot)
classification accuracy and the number of synthetic clips
augmented per training clip. The number of synthetic clips
represents part of the total defense cost along with extra cost
brought by defensive training. We show in Fig. 6 and Table XI
that on architecture A, poisoned hotspot accuracy rises from
19% to 92% by augmenting from none to 50 synthetic clips per
training clip, and it reaches 97% by expanding from 50 to 500
∗N.B.: For Fig. 6, Fig. 7, and Table XI: C-NH = clean non-hotspot,
C-HS = clean hotspot, P-NH = poisoned non-hotspot, P-HS = poisoned
hotspot.
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Fig. 5. Relative Attack Success Rate (R-ASR) after defensive augmentation
by varying from 3 to 500 synthetic clips augmented per training clip. Charts
use a log10 scale on x-axis.
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Fig. 6. Effect on Accuracy (Architecture A). Charts use a log10 scale on
x-axis.
clips. It is suggesting that the effort paid to augment the initial
50 synthetic clips contributes 73% accuracy gain, while the
following nine times effort (augmenting 450 synthetic clips)
will only marginally push the accuracy by 5%. A similar
accuracy vs. defense augmentation cost trade-off on network
architecture B is shown in Fig. 7 and Table XI. The first 25
synthetic clips augmented per training clip accounts for 79%
(16% to 95%) accuracy boost, and the following 475 synthetic
clips further increase the accuracy by 4% (95% to 99%).
VII. DISCUSSION
A. What Does the Network Learn?
Our results suggest that all networks (Acl, Bcl, Abd, Bbd,
Adf500, and Bdf500) can successfully learn the genuine fea-
tures of hotspots/non-hotspots, demonstrated by their clean
data classification accuracy. From Abd and Bbd, it shows that
DNNs have surplus learning capability to grasp the backdoor
trigger on a layout clip, and decisively, prioritize the presence
of the trigger as an indication of being non-hotspot over
the actual hotspot or non-hotspot features. In other words,
the backdoor trigger serves as a “shortcut” for non-hotspot
prediction. Adf500 and Bdf500 further manifest the abundant
learning capacity of DNNs, as both biased and unbiased data
are learned and correctly classified with increased clean and
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Fig. 7. Effect on Accuracy (Architecture B). Charts use a log10 scale on
x-axis.
TABLE VIII
NO. OF VALID SYNTHETIC CLIPS FROM DEFENSIVE AUGMENTATION
Original After Augmentation
# clips hotspot non-hotspot
Clean training hotspot 950 + 213302 + 249416
Clean training non-hotspot 19050 + 36257 –
Poisoned training non-hotspot 2194 + 1285 –
poisoned data classification accuracy. It suggests DNNs learn
extra details of hotspot/non-hotspot features.
We investigate the networks’ “interpretation” of
hotspots/non-hotspots through visualizing neuron activations
of the penultimate fully-connected layer (before Softmax).
We abstract and visualize the high-dimensional data using
2D t-SNE plots [32]. We depict the clean network Acl
in Fig. 8(a), backdoored network Abd in Fig. 8(b), and
defended network Adf500 in Fig. 8(c). In Fig. 8(a), hotspots
and non-hotspots roughly spread on two sides, and within
each side, clean and poisoned (non-)hotspots mix. Fig. 8(a)
suggests a benignly trained network on clean data is able to
classify layout clips despite the bias presented by the trigger.
In Fig. 8(b), poisoned hotspots cluster with clean/poisoned
non-hotspots, sitting on the opposite side of clean hotspots,
demonstrating the “shortcut” effect of the trigger learned
by a backdoored network. While in Fig. 8(c), we witness
two separated groups of hotspots and non-hotspots, and
intra-cluster clean/poisoned clips highly interweave. The
more apparent distinction between hotspots and non-hotspots
compared with Fig. 8(a) manifests the higher classification
accuracy of Adf500 than Acl.
For additional insight, we apply t-SNE techniques to the
input data of dimension 10 × 10 × 32 to the networks, as
shown in Fig. 9. There are no visible and clear separations
between clean/poisoned hotspots/non-hotspots, given the sub-
tlety and innocuousness of the backdoor trigger. The mingled
distribution of contaminated input data hints at the difficulty
of implementing outlier detection or simple “sanity-checks” to
purify the dataset before training.
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CONFUSION MATRIX OF (DEFENDED) NETWORK Adf500
Prediction
clean data poisoned data
non-hotspot hotspot non-hotspot hotspot
Condition non-hotspot 0.86 0.14 0.92 0.08hotspot 0.10 0.90 0.03 0.97
TABLE X
CONFUSION MATRIX OF (DEFENDED) NETWORK Bdf500
Prediction
clean data poisoned data
non-hotspot hotspot non-hotspot hotspot
Condition non-hotspot 0.92 0.08 0.96 0.04hotspot 0.05 0.95 0.01 0.99
B. Effect of Network Architecture Complexity
Between Table VI and Table VII, Table IX and Table X,
we observe network architecture B produces higher clean
data classification accuracy, suggesting that more complex
networks are better to learn the true features of hotspots/non-
hotspots. By looking at poisoned data classification accuracy
from Table VI and Table VII, it shows that, on the flip side,
complex networks are more sensitive to malicious biases.
From the standpoint of the defense strategy, as shown
in Fig. 5, it hints that more complex networks require less
augmentation effort for the reduction in attack success rate—
generally, it appears that the greater learning capacity implies
higher sensitivity to backdooring but also easier “curing”.
C. Improved Clean Data Accuracy
Across defended networks with different amounts of data
augmentation, we find that clean non-hotspot classification
accuracy increases in both A and B. This effect is more
pronounced in defended networks based on B. This points to
a helpful side-effect of using defensive data augmentation—
while effort is required to produce more synthetic clips for
defeating training data poisoning, accuracy on clean test data
also increases. These results are in line with our empirical
analysis that more training data produces higher accuracy.
D. Trigger-oblivious Defense
Training data poisoning attacks essentially introduce a back-
door trigger to the network as a “shortcut” for misclassifi-
cation. A number of existing defense strategies [10], [16],
as we discussed in Section II, focus on reverse engineering
the backdoor trigger. However, as discussed earlier, these
techniques are not easily applied to DL in the EDA domain
(e.g., NNoculation’s [16] random noise augmentation does
not readily translate here), such defenses also suffer from
the poor quality of reverse-engineered triggers (e.g., Neural
Cleanse [10]). Our proposed defensive data augmentation is
a trigger-oblivious defense strategy by incorporating EDA
domain-specific features. In practice, data augmentation is also
(a) t-SNE visualization of clean hotspot detector
(b) t-SNE visualization of backdoored hotspot detector
(c) t-SNE visualization of defended hotspot detector
Fig. 8. t-SNE visualizations of neuron activations of the penultimate fully-
connected layer of CNN-based hotspot detectors when presented with various
layout clips
a common strategy to expand the information-theoretic content
of the training dataset used in EDA applications. Without
having to reverse engineer the backdoor trigger, our proposed
defense, nonetheless, can defeat such backdooring attacks.
E. Defense Cost Analysis
The additional cost incurred by our defense strategy consists
of data augmentation, DRC of the synthetic clips, and lithog-
raphy simulation for synthetic clips, as well as extra training
cost due to expanded training dataset. This is a one-time,
up-front cost. Considering the significant enhancement of
security and robustness (up to 83% ASR reduction), this cost
is easily amortized over the lifetime of the DL-based detector
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TABLE XI
ACCURACY AND ATTACK SUCCESS/RELATIVE ATTACK SUCCESS AFTER TRAINING WITH DEFENSIVELY AUGMENTED DATASETS
Accuracy, Architecture A Attack on A Accuracy, Architecture B Attack on B
Synthetic Variants per Training Clip C-NH C-HS P-NH P-HS ASR R-ASR C-NH C-HS P-NH P-HS ASR R-ASR
0 0.81 0.89 0.99 0.19 0.81 1.00 0.81 0.91 1 0.16 0.84 1.00
3 0.8 0.92 0.98 0.32 0.68 0.84 0.79 0.91 0.95 0.62 0.38 0.45
6 0.82 0.89 0.97 0.54 0.46 0.57 0.8 0.9 0.93 0.77 0.23 0.27
12 0.79 0.9 0.96 0.62 0.38 0.47 0.92 0.9 0.98 0.82 0.18 0.21
25 0.84 0.89 0.94 0.77 0.23 0.28 0.93 0.92 0.96 0.95 0.05 0.06
50 0.85 0.9 0.92 0.92 0.08 0.10 0.94 0.92 0.97 0.96 0.04 0.05
100 0.87 0.91 0.94 0.89 0.11 0.14 0.93 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.04 0.05
200 0.85 0.89 0.91 0.98 0.02 0.02 0.93 0.93 0.97 0.94 0.06 0.07
300 0.84 0.9 0.91 0.96 0.04 0.05 0.94 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.04 0.05
400 0.86 0.89 0.91 0.96 0.04 0.05 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.02 0.02
500 0.86 0.9 0.92 0.97 0.03 0.04 0.92 0.95 0.96 0.99 0.01 0.01
Fig. 9. t-SNE visualization of network input of clean and poisoned clips after
DCT transformation
(which can be further extended through future fine-tuning),
this one-off defense strategy is economical. Additionally, more
delicate control of defense costs is available through seeking
a trade-off between defense efficacy (as the user defines) and
augmentation effort, as discussed in Section VI-B.
F. Experimental Limitations and Threats to Validity
While our experiments show that defensive data augmen-
tation can effectively mitigate training data poisoning by
producing ∼50 synthetic clips per training clips, the absolute
numbers will not necessarily generalize beyond our exper-
imental setting as each data point is taken from a single
training instance for each augmentation amount. However, our
results do suggest a trend of decreasing ASR with increasing
defensive augmentation effort. Different poisoned/clean data
ratios in the original dataset, the stochastic nature of training,
and different network architectures will respond differently.
G. Wider Implications in EDA
The success of our defensive data augmentation against
training data poisoning attacks on DL-based lithographic
hotspot detection also implies that other DL-enhanced EDA
applications may benefit from similarly constructed schemes.
Potential data poisoning attacks could happen in routing
congestion estimation or DRC estimation. Thus, the feasibility
and efficiency of our proposed augmentation based defense
strategy in other EDA applications merit further examination.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a trigger-oblivious antidote for
training data poisoning on lithographic hotspot detectors. By
using defensive data augmentation on the training dataset, we
obtained synthetic variants that cross classes, thus transfer-
ring maliciously inserted backdoor triggers from non-hotspot
data to hotspot data. Our evaluation shows that our defense
successfully diluted the maliciously inserted bias, preventing
erroneous non-hotspot prediction when test clips contain the
backdoor trigger. With the attack success rate reduced to ∼0%,
it succeeded in robustifying lithographic hotspot detectors
under adversarial settings.
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